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Domestic Spying: The Case of the French Government and 
Royalists in the Early Third Republic 
.ALAN GRUBB 
Clemson University 
The recent controversy surrounding the continuing revelations and 
charges of domestic spying and surveillance by the F.B.I., the C.I.A., 
and even the Internal Revenue Service brings to mind a similar problem 
and situation in late nineteenth century France. This involved the French 
government's persistent but, as it turned out, unnecessary surveillance of 
the activities of leading conservative politicians and the various royalist 
parties during the early years of the Third Republic, the results of which 
can be found in the Archives Nationales under the inflated and rather 
undeserved title "royalist intrigues". 1 The contents of these thirteen boxes 
of reports from prefects, police agents, special investigators and paid 
informants make interesting reading, not for any information they pro-
vide of royalist activities ( of which there was surprisingly little), but 
for what the reports suggest of the government's attitude and actions: 
its fear of outsiders, its gullibility, its tendency to overreact and draw 
upon arbitrary and occasionally illegal police powers, and finally, the 
bureaucratization and triviality of so much of its investigation. 
Already Alexis de Tocqueville in his classic study, The Old Regime 
and French Revolution ( 1856), had observed of the outlook of the 
French civil service under the ancien regime monarchy, ", .. its intense 
dislike for all outsiders, whether of noble or of middle-class extraction, 
who showed a wish to take a hand, on their own initiative, in public 
affairs. Any independent group, however small, which seemed desirous 
of taking action otherwise than under the aegis of the administration 
filled it with alarm, and the tiniest free association of citizens, however 
harmless its aims, was regarded as a nuisance." 2 The material examined 
in this article is only a small sample of what was clearly an extensive, 
thorough investigation of various "political" groups in France during the 
period. There are, for example, more boxes on other "right-wing" groups, 
the Bonapartists and the clericals, and doubtless even more exist on 
1 Archives Nationales, Agissements royalists, 1875-1908, Police Generale, F712-
431-12444. These reports are unnumbered, often undated, and in no particular chron-
ological or topical order. 
2 Alex.is de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. by 
Stuart Gilbert ( Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, 1955), pp. 63-64. 
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various radical and socialist organizations. 3 However, this should suffice 
to indicate the French government's response to a real or imagined roy-
alist threat, thereby raising some questions about the nature and useful-
ness of some aspects of domestic spying. 
What prompted French republicans, contrary to their declared prin-
ciples and their own vigorous complaints of police harassment under 
the Second Empire, to inaugurate and maintain for nearly twenty-five 
years this surveillance of their royalist opposition? In part, the answe r 
is that the Republic inherited from previous regimes an administrative 
and police system that was left largely unreformed; hence, the same, 
generally apolitical personnel continued to function in the traditional 
manner, the only difference being that their suspicions and harassments 
were now directed at royalists, Bonapartists , clericals and radicals in-
stead of republicans. Furthermore, once in power the republicans, like 
those before them, sensed the partisan advantages of controlling the 
centralized administration and police that had nothing to do with ide-
ology. As Daniel Halevy, the somewhat disillusioned historian and critic 
of the Third Republic, later remarked of the republicans' attitude to-
wards the police: 
We have had, for ten years, conservative ministers and almost 
socialist ministers: all have favored the Police. The authoritarian 
republicans, openly, out of doctrine and tradition. The radical-
socialists, for reasons of prudence: audacious ( it is their principle), 
they are afraid of their own audacity and spare and respect the 
institution half-secretly on which they are counting some day to 
save them from their own imprudence or the violence of their 
friends.4, 
Or, as Sanche de Gramont observed recently, "Every Minister of Interior 
and every police prefect finds his own secret dossier on his desk when 
he takes power, as a kind of welcome mat." 5 This, then, was the nature 
of the institution. The French police has its particular traditions, lega-
cies of the Old Regime and Napoleon, and the republicans simply in-
herited them and, despite apparent ideological differences, left them 
unchanged. 
8 Archives Nationales, Agissements bonapartistes, 1871-1893, Police Generale, 
F712428-12430 and Agissements clericaux, 1872-1908, Police Generale, F712477-
12486. 
"Daniel Halevy, "Clio aux Enfers," Decadence de la Liberte (Paris, Bernard 
Grasset, 1931), p. 157. 
5 Sanche de Gramont, The French, Portrait of a People (New York, G. P. Put-
nam's Sons, 1969), p. 220. 
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More important in determining their outlook were the conditions in 
which the Republic was founded. Ironically it was not the republicans 
but the monarchists who established the new regime by the Constitution 
of 1875, and the conservatives or monarchists relinquished power grudg-
ingly, only after a major political and constitutional crisis, the 16th of 
May affair in 1877. The republicans finally wrested control of the Re-
public from their royalist opponents when the conservative president 
MacMahon resigned in 1879, but they did not forget the bitter struggles 
of the 1870's. As so often happens, the republicans could not shake their 
obsessive fear of the Right. They continued to fear the royalists, in spite 
of the signs of their dwindling influence and debilitating divisions. The 
republcans' memories and fears were heightened by their appreciation 
of France's volatile political tradition, which did not encourage any gov-
ernment to treat lightly its opposition. The police, in particular, always 
kept one eye on the streets where barricades were raised and revolutions 
made, and in a country that had already experienced five revolutions 
and two coups d'etat, the precautions of the Ministry of Interior and 
the police are understandable. 
Some historians have suggested that, given the weakness of the 
royalist opposition and the unlikelihood of a return of the monarchy, the 
period of moderate republican rule from 1879 to 1899 was one of the 
great wasted opportunities of modem French history. 6 As one royalist 
leader remarked in 1879, upon hearing of the Prince lmperial's death, 
"The Republic has the luck of it; the Comte de Paris ( the Orleanist 
pretender who was in contention with the Comte de Chambord, the 
Legitimist claimant) is alive and the Prince Imperial is dead." 7 On the 
contrary, the disarray of the royalists did nothing to abate their fear of 
the monarchists or their insistence on the need to defend the Republic 
against threats from the Right. Gordon Wright has pointed out that 
this was partly a tactic of republicans who, themselves divided on many 
issues, needed the royalist menace as a substitute for the positive pro-
gram they lacked and frequently as a scapegoat for their own govern-
mental incompetence and unimaginativeness. 8 Even the most dramatic 
of their undertakings in domestic affairs, the acrimonious anti-clerical 
program of the 1880's, by which they attacked Catholic interests, served 
the same purpose; and since the monarchists were the principal ( or at 
least loudest) defenders of the Church's interests, this had the effect of 
further antagonizing conservative opinion and galvanizing republicans 
6 Gordon Wright, France in Modem Times ( Chicago, Rand McNally, 1960 ), 
p. 296. 
7 Albert Vandam, My Paris Note--Book (London, William Heinemann, 1894), 
p. 219. 
8 Wright, France in Modem Times, p. 296. 
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to the defense of the Republic. "The republicans govern badly," the 
republican writer Anatole France reportedly grumbled at the tum of 
the century, 'but they defend themselves well." 9 Indeed, as the reports 
of the Prefect of Police indicate, they often defended themselves against 
non-existent threats or intrigues cooked up or blown out of all propor-
tion by police agents themselves. 
Nonetheless, if the republicans exaggerated and manipulated the 
dangers, their fears do not seem entirely sham. They remained haunted 
by a specter of royalist intrigues. There was much talk in the police 
reports of the period of "royalist plots" and, although the government's 
agents were always rather sketchy about details, these fears seem genu-
ine enough in the beginning. 10 In the early 1880's the government was 
particularly vigilant about royalist activities and propaganda, reacting 
to their noisy but harmless and ineffectual actions with an elaborate 
surveillance that frequently bordered on the absurd. The governmen t 
had agents and informers within various royalist organizations; they 
watched over meetings, tailed prominent conservative politicians, infil-
trated the entourage of the royalist pretenders, even at times intercept -
ing their mail; and they seized royalist literature, although one prefect 
had sufficient scruples to remind the government that it was exceeding 
its powers. "Regarding your recent instructions," he replied to Paris, "I 
will confiscate the brochures and photographs of the Due d'Orleans, bu t 
I must point out that this action is illegal." 11 
In 1884, for example, the Ministry of Interior, concerned about the 
upcoming legislative elections, instructed the prefects to send it the fol-
lowing information: ( 1) Has the royalist party been reorganized since 
the death of the Comte de Chambord? ( 2) How does this organization 
function? By arrondissement? By canton? ( 3) What journals are at the 
party's disposal? ( 4) Are there committees? Old or new? How do they 
differ from the old? ( 5) General observations. 12 This circular, soon leake d 
to the press, caused an uproar among royalists; but, while the prefects 
responded diligently with detailed reports, the investigation failed to 
substantiate the government's alarm or even to uncover evidence of any 
significant royalist organization. One report, indeed, indicated that one 
department, the Eure, had no organization, no committee, and no roy-
alist newspaper; another dutifully noted that the royalists' slogan was 
9 Anatole France, L'Eglise et la Republique, ed. by Robert Sazerat (Paris, Jean-
Jacques Pauvert, 1964), p. 39. 
10 Various reports for the 1880's, Agissements royalistes, F712346. 
11 Confidential report of a prefect to the Minister of Interior, Police Genera le, 
January 20, 1890, Agissements royalistes, F712438. 
12 Eugene Schnerb circular to the prefects, September 5, 1884, Agissements 
royalistes, F712431. 
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"Everyone knows that, according to the present republican constitution, 
it suffices for a vote of the chambers reunited to repl,ace the Republic 
by the monarchy the day when the country will recognize that such is 
in its interest in order to avoid more certainly bankruptcy and war," 
hardly an incendiary or illegal appeal. 13 Other reports catalogued the 
names and dates of the royalist pretenders' visitors, gave repetitious 
analyses of the divisions in royalist ranks, and provided nearly verbatim 
accounts of what was said by those who attended various royalist "ac-
tion" groups.14 
The conservative parties ( Orleanists, Legitimists, and Bonapartists) 
did, in fact, stage something of a resurgence in the elections of 1885. 
However, most historians agree that this was a temporary success, the 
result less of effective royalist propaganda than of popular dissatisfaction 
with repub lican rule. For the conservatives, a contemporary correctly 
observed, the seemingly favorable electoral outcome "announces not re-
vival, but death." 15 Nevertheless, if 1885 can be regard ed in retrospect 
as the official death of the old conservative party, the government's sur-
veillance and harassment of royalists continued almost unabated. 
One group that particularly drew the government's attention was 
the Jeunesse Royaliste, a group of younger, militant royalists whose 
loud and ostentatious demonstrations and loose talk of a royalist coup 
aetat seems to have been taken seriously in the late 1880's. In fact, 
from the beginning the government's agents had precise, inside infor-
mation of the group. The members of the Jeunesse Royaliste talked a 
lot but, as it turned out, mad e few efforts to execute their political fan-
tasies. Read the right way, these detailed reports of their plans and 
conversations are rather humorous, for quite apart from the cumulative 
picture of respectable but boisterous aristocratic young men playing at 
"revolution", the reports indicate the agents' gullibility-or cupidity-
and the government's paranoia , at least its apparent willingness to ac-
cept the flimsiest accounts of clandestine royalist activities. Deadly seri-
ous and unrelieved by the slightest traces of skepticism, these reports 
chronicle plans, plots , meetings that never materialized, the noisy inci-
dents that fizzled out, the hopelessness of their opposition, reduc ed as 
they were to theoretical, largely imaginary conspiracies, or useless dis-
tribution of literature, most of which had to be posted at night and was 
immediately seized by the police.1 6 
13 Undated report of 1884, Agissements royalistes, F712431. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Georges Hoog, Les Conservateurs et la Ille Republique (Paris, Bloud, 1910), 
pp. 74-75. 
16 Various reports from the 1880's and early 1890's, Agissements royalistes, 
F712431. 
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Even the government came in time to realize how exaggerated were 
its anxieties. In a report of March 31, 1887, one of their agents, after an 
exceptionally detailed account of the militant royalists' activities, ad-
mitted in a surprisingly rare moment of candor of one of the Jeunesse 
Royaliste's weekly Wednesday luncheons at Durand's: "their conversa-
tions were banal-platonic talk of the return of the monarchy." 17 Al-
though such admissions did not bring an immediate end of surveillance 
( there were always too many agents who suggested that , despite the 
paucity of immediate evidence, the possibility of some future royalist 
coup), the government's interest in Jeunesse Royaliste activities began 
to taper off in the mid-'nineties. By July, 1896, an agent realistica lly 
reported that there were only about thirty royalist committees that func-
tioned regularly, that the royalists had been hampered by a lack of funds 
since the Comte de Paris' death and that they were plagued by divisions, 
particularly by a generational conflict whereby the older royalists dis-
liked and refused to cooperate with the Jeunesse Royaliste. 18 In other 
words, despite their youthful enthusiasm and rudeness, they were not 
much of a threat to the Republic. "Their treasury is always empty," the 
agent concluded, "and in Paris the Jeunesse Royaliste is only an organ-
ization of snobs." 19 
The government also expended a great deal of effort spying on 
prominent royalist politicians. One who was a special object of attention 
was Due Albert de Broglie, former conservative leader and prime minis-
ter in the opening years of the Third Republic, head of the conservative 
ministry during the 16th of May crisis of 1877. In view of Broglie's pas t 
prominence and his skill as a parliamentary strategist, as well as his 
reputation as a political Machiavellian and the bete noir of the republi-
cans, the republican government's close scrutiny of the duke after 1877 
is hardly surprising. What is surprising is that it continued to spy upon 
him long after he had ceased to influence royalist policy and suspected 
him of activities that were so clearly out of character. 
The Due de Broglie was scarcely the type of person to participate 
in or condone the noisy, militant, antiparliamentary tactics of groups 
like the ]eunesse Royaliste. He represented the older royalist tradition; 
he was an old-fashioned liberal, a constitutional monarchist, a resolved 
moderate and supporter of the "juste milieu", an instinctive opponent of 
extremism on all sides. Moreover, as the government ought to have real-
ized, Broglie was unpopular with much of the Right, owing to his "fail-
17 Report of March 31, 1887, Agissements royalistes, F712431. 
18 Report of July 20, 1896, Agissements royal.istes, F712431 and report of August 
28, 1896, F712438 . 
19 Report of July 20, 1896, F712431. 
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ure" as conservative leader in the 1870's and he was increasingly out of 
step with his fellow monarchists. Even in the early 1880's, when Catho-
lics and monarchists loudly protested republican religious policy, Broglie, 
who defended Catholic interests in the Senate, remained a moderate. 
Despite his growing disenchantment with the Republic , especially after 
his defeat for the Senate in 1884, he eschewed the violent rhetoric of 
other royalists whose anti-republicanism subsequently led them to sup-
port General Boulanger. Broglie refused to have anything to do with the 
Boulangist movement; he even, or so many believed, encouraged the 
republican government to use its police powers against this new "man 
on horseback." 20 As he somewhat humorously but firmly rebuked a 
friend, Leon Lavedan, editor of the conservative paper Le Correspond-
ant: 
I have just read your article ( on Boulanger and why monarch-
ists ought to support him): You are hard on the monarchy. Can it 
really play the role of Boulanger, I mean with War and parades, 
mounted on a black horse, just to win the applause of the common 
herd? Wouldn't it be the same as asking a nice girl why she doesn't 
earn, with her attractive qualities, as much money as her friend 
who knows how to show herself off with a furnished apartment and 
a horsedrawn carriage? 21 
Yet the republican government acted as if it feared this middle-
aged, moderate monarchist, who bore one of France's most illustrious 
aristocratic names, who sat in the French Academy and who was es-
teemed as a historian and man of letters, whom Lord Acton once called 
the most distinguished lay Catholic thinker of his day .22 As long as 
Broglie remained politically active and prominent as a conservative/ 
Catholic spokesman, particularly up to his defeat for the Senate, the 
administration and police followed closely his movements . Carefully 
noted were his speeches in the Senate, his discourses before various con-
servative or Catholic societies, and his sporadic attendance at royalist 
meetings. In 1885 he was described as a member of the Comite de la 
rue du Marche Saint-Honore, a group of old royalists who conducted 
propaganda for the Comte de Paris; a report of June 3, 1887, placed him 
at a meeting of royalists to discuss ways of using the recent ministerial 
20 Albert de Broglie, Histoire et politique (Paris, Calmann-Uvy, 1897), ix-xxil. 
21 Albert de Broglie to Leon Lavedan, March 18, 1888, Fonds Lavedan-
Boucher, Archives Nationales, 305AP-7. 
22 For more information concerning the duke's political career, see Charles Alan 
Grubb, "The Politics of Pessimism: A Political Biography of Due Albert de Broglie 
during the Early Third Republic" ( Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1969). 
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crisis to discredit the Republic ; a report of March, 1884, noted that he 
was a member of the Comite consultatif royaliste, an advisory board of 
the pretend er, served as president of the monarchist newsp aper Moni-
teur universel, and acted as pr esident of the Comite royaliste cf action 
tie I'Eure; only grudgingly did the agent acknowledge that he was not 
on good terms with the pretend er's close associates or that th e Eure had 
never been a district in which monarchism was a political force and had 
no royalist organization so that these were empty honors . 23 Perhaps the 
government's careful scrutiny reached its most absurd level in a report 
from a confidential agent who had followed the vacationing duke to 
Zurich: 
It appears that M. de Broglie , former minister, has had , at the 
Hotel Baur au Lac, a confidential interview with Marshal von 
Moltke. We have asked for, from Berne, an investigation of this 
interview. 24 
To add even more melodrama to the possibility of Broglie's meeting 
with the famous Prussian general, the agent noted that Broglie had 
"tried to remain incognito but was recognized"; and he concluded with 
the tantalizing suggestion that, as the Comte de Paris also was rumored 
to be in Switzerland, it was "possible that the Due de Broglie has had 
a private talk with the royalist pret ender ," although he conceded he 
knew nothing of the contents of their discussion or even if it had taken 
place. 25 
Such reports, carefully but rather fantastically embroidered, are 
typical of much of the republican government's surveillance of royal 
activities. In retrospect, they seem deliberately alarmist , padded, mis-
leading , most often tentative and hypothetical, if not fictional, in their 
delineation of royalist conspiracies. They indicate the republicans' fears, 
but also that their agents fed those fears and, in turn, were literally fed 
by them. After reading nearly twenty-five years of these reports, crammed 
full of fascinating but insignificant detail, they seem a monument to 
imaginary or at least unrealized anxieties; and yet the police agents 
always kept alive a possibility of the royalist menace, one report sug-
gesting as late as 1896 that the Orleanists were "on the verge of staging 
a great coup." 26 The republican government overreacted to its royalis t 
critics and was, it seems, duped by its own agents or informers who 
28 Various reports, Agissements royalistes, F712431, 12433, 12438. 
H Report of October 16, 1886, Agissements royalistes, F712433 . 
25 Ibid. 
26 Undated report of 1896, Agissements royalistes, F712431. 
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dragged out this aspect of domestic spying longer than events justified. 
Fear is difficult to exorcise but in time the republicans put their concern 
with the old royalists behind them. A report of September 28, 1897, 
frankly stated of the royalist party and the seventy-six year old Due de 
Broglie: 
In the party temporization is personi£ed by the old friends of 
the Comte de Paris. There are even certain conservatives, those who 
used to direct, who have withdrawn completely under the cover of 
their vows and who would not perhaps even follow an attempt or 
an evolution towards the monarchy. Of this group, the most sig-
ni£cant is the Due de Broglie, although he is president of the policy 
committee of the Moniteur universel, M. le due d'Orleans' paper. 
The Due de Broglie is bitter. An epoch already old, that of the 
famous marche parallele, he pushed a little too far the union with 
the Bonapartists in the Eure. There were certain compromises with 
Raoul Duval and Janvier de la Motte for which he was tactlessly 
reproached; certain dossiers were brought to the Comte de Paris, 
who showed himself personally very annoyed. 
From that time the Due fell into disgrace, and he has nursed 
a secret grudge about it; he is tl1e first of those who desire as an 
ideal of government a republic without republicans, even and es-
pecially to the exclusion of the monarchy. 27 
Thus, nearly twenty years after the monarchists had lost power and 
eleven years after the Due de Broglie's retirement from politics, the 
republican administration ceased to fear and spy upon the old royalist 
leadership. 
One has mixed feelings about the kind of governmental activity 
these reports reveal. For historians they are an unexpected windfall; 
however fanciful or petty the contents, the reports provide a mass of 
"evidence" historians would otherwise not have had. On the other hand, 
this material is padded, often ill-informed and obscurely and perhaps 
selfishly motivated. Above all, the reports raise questions about the re-
publican government's, or any government's, respect for privacy and in-
dividual liberty and about the rationale of certain kinds of government 
investigations of its citizens. That a republican government, so little 
threatened in reality by the Right until the Dreyfus Affair at the end 
of the 1890's should expend so much effort covering the activities of an 
27 Report of September 28, 1897, Agissements royalistes, F712431. 
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increasingly ineffectual, disorganized, unpopular and numerically insig-
nificant royalist opposition seems incredible but enlightening. It tells us 
much about the paranoia of French republicans after 1879 and, perhaps, 
of governments generally. It may also suggest, at least in retrospect, how 
useless much of this information has proved, but that the "fear of others," 
which de Tocqueville mentions in The Old Regime and the French 
Revolution, is a perennial rather than just a historical problem. 
